Redefining Agency Power: Loper Bright v. Raimondo and the Demise of Chevron Deference
Edmund J. Martinez, MBA, MPH, PMP
7 min read
Introduction
The 2024 Supreme Court case, Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, represents a significant development in administrative law, particularly regarding the interpretation of statutes and the role of administrative agencies. Delving into the key aspects of the case, including the facts, legal arguments, and the Court’s decision, and explore the implications of the ruling for future administrative law cases and the balance of power between administrative agencies and the judiciary.
Case Background
According to the United States Supreme Court opinion, Loper Bright Enterprises involved a dispute between commercial fishermen and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) over a regulation that restricted the amount of Atlantic herring they could catch. The fishermen argued that the NMFS had exceeded its authority under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSA) in implementing the regulation. This case presented a central question: whether courts should defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute, even if the statute is ambiguous (LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES ET AL. v. RAIMONDO, SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, ET AL., 2024). Both petitioners and respondents presented their arguments prior to the courts decision.
Legal Arguments
Petitioners in Loper Bright contended that the MSA was clear and unambiguous, and that the NMFS’s interpretation of the statute was unreasonable. They argued that the Court should not defer to the agency’s interpretation under the Chevron doctrine, a legal standard that generally requires courts to defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of a statute (CHEVRON U. S. A. INC. v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC., ET AL., 1984).
Respondents, represented by the U.S. government, countered that the MSA was ambiguous and that the NMFS’s interpretation was reasonable. They argued that the Chevron doctrine applied and that the Court should defer to the agency’s expertise in interpreting the statute.
The Court’s Decision
In a significant departure from precedent, the Supreme Court in Loper Bright rejected the Chevron doctrine and held that courts must interpret statutes independently, without deferring to an agency’s interpretation. The Court reasoned that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requires courts to “decide all relevant questions of law” and that this mandate precludes deferential review of agency interpretations of law (LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES ET AL. v. RAIMONDO, SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, ET AL., 2024).
Implications of the Ruling
The Loper Bright decision has far-reaching implications for administrative law. By rejecting the Chevron doctrine, the Court has effectively shifted the balance of power between administrative agencies and Administrative Law Judges (ALJ) in favor of Article III judiciary. Although it remains to be seen how lower courts will apply the Loper Bright decision in future cases, the ruling may have implications for other areas of law, such as, public health, environmental law and telecommunications law, where agency interpretations of statutes often play a critical role. This could also have an impact on the roles and responsibilities of both the Administrative Law Judges and the Article III judges.
Comparing the Judges
Administrative Law Judges (ALJs)
Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) play a crucial role within the administrative state. They oversee adjudications in various areas, including disability benefits, international trade, taxation, environmental law, occupational safety, and communications law (Harvard Law Review, 2019). Here are key points to consider:
- Appointment and Status:
- ALJs are appointed under 5 U.S.C. § 3105 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). They serve as quasi-judicial officers within federal agencies.
- Their appointment is subject to constitutional requirements, specifically the Appointments Clause, which mandates that “inferior officers” must be appointed by the President, courts, or heads of departments (Harvard Law Review, 2019).
- Lucia v. SEC Decision:
- In the Lucia v. SEC case (2018), the U.S. Supreme Court held that SEC ALJs are “inferior officers”, and their appointment process must comply with constitutional standards.
- The Court emphasized the significance of ALJs’ duties and discretion, aligning them with other officers like Special Trial Judges (STJs) in the U.S. Tax Court (Harvard Law Review, 2019)
Article III Judges: An Overview
Article III of the United States Constitution establishes the judicial branch. Here are key points related to Article III judges:
- Role and Vested Power:
- Article III vests the judicial power of the United States in one Supreme Court and in inferior courts established by Congress.
- Article III judges preside over federal cases, interpreting the Constitution, federal laws, and treaties.
- Appointment and Tenure:
- Article III judges include Supreme Court Justices and federal district court judges.
- They hold their offices during good behavior, meaning they serve for life unless impeached and removed by Congress.
- Their compensation cannot be diminished during their tenure.
Discussion
Following the Loper Bright opinion was published, The Natural Resource Defense Council (NRDC) puts out a press release and a statement, written NRDC Sr. Attorney, David Doniger, stating the following:
“This is a profound change, and a terrible one. It’s part of this Court’s broad, concerted effort to make it harder for our government to function.
“Whether they’re making food safer, air cleaner or safeguarding prescription drugs, agencies need to be able to respond to complex problems the modern world throws at us. This decision is profoundly destabilizing and leaves policy – and public health – up to the individual preferences and political biases of unaccountable judges” (Natural Resources Defense Council, 2024)
Developing policies, that are formulated from legislation are done through government agencies under the executive branch bridging laws with policies that are enforced by those government agencies such as the Department of Health and Human Services (Longest, Jr., 2015). The Chevron deference added more authority to the government agencies as they are considered the experts in their respective industries and would be better suited to develop policies to where the legislator’s intentions were not clear or ambiguous creating a two-step process that would be as follows:
Step 1: Has Congress Directly Spoken to the Precise Question at Issue?
- Explanation: The first step asks whether the statute in question is clear and unambiguous regarding the specific issue. If Congress has directly addressed the issue in the statute, then both the court and the agency must give effect to Congress’s clear intent. There is no need for further interpretation, and the agency’s interpretation is irrelevant if it contradicts the clear meaning of the statute.
Step 2: Is the Agency’s Interpretation Based on a Permissible Construction of the Statute?
- Explanation: If the statute is ambiguous or silent on the specific issue (i.e., Congress has not clearly spoken to the question), the court moves to the second step. Here, the court considers whether the agency’s interpretation is “reasonable” or “permissible.” If the agency’s interpretation is reasonable, even if the court might have interpreted the statute differently, the court should defer to the agency’s expertise and uphold the agency’s interpretation.
This two-step process allows agencies flexibility in interpreting statutes within their purview, as long as their interpretations are reasonable and not contrary to clear congressional intent (CHEVRON U. S. A. INC. v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC., ET AL., 1984).
In recent years, the debate surrounding Chevron deference has intensified, with proponents and critics offering contrasting perspectives:
- Preserving Expertise vs. Mitigating Overreach:
- Proponents argue that Chevron deference ensures agencies benefit from expert advice and recommendations. By deferring to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes, the judiciary acknowledges their specialized knowledge.
- Critics, however, contend that excessive agency authority can lead to overreach. Administrative Law Judges (ALJs), as internal agency employees, wield significant power—acting as enforcers, legislators, and judges within their respective industries.
- The NRDC Case and Shifting Perspectives:
- In Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (1984), the Supreme Court upheld Chevron’s ability to modify plants without stringent air pollution reduction requirements.
- Fast forward 40 years: The Court’s recent Loper Bright ruling essentially reversed its 1984 stance. The NRDC, once opposed to Chevron’s position, now questions this shift. What prompted this change?
- Balancing Clarity and Agency Autonomy:
- Overturning Chevron deference may reduce bias and corruption risks, it also exposes agencies to legislative gaps, potentially resulting from intentionally vague statutes.
- Striking the right balance between agency expertise and accountability remains a critical challenge.
by Sara E. Wilensky, Joel B. Teitelbaum
Conclusion
The Loper Bright case represents a significant development in administrative law, with potentially far-reaching implications for the relationship between administrative agencies and the judiciary. By rejecting the Chevron doctrine, the Court has signaled a willingness to assert greater control over agency interpretations of law. The ongoing discourse over Chevron deference underscores the delicate equilibrium between agency autonomy and the need for transparent, well-defined policies. Although long-term consequences of this decision remain to be seen, it is likely to shape administrative law for years to come.
Works Cited
- CHEVRON U. S. A. INC. v. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC., ET AL., 82-1005 (The United States Supreme Court February 29, 1984).
- Harvard Law Review. (2019, January 10). Guidance on Administrative Law Judges After Lucia v. SEC (S. Ct.), July 2018. Solicitor General Issues Guidance On Administrative Judges., pp. 1120-1127.
- Longest, Jr., B. B. (2015). Health Policy Making in the United States. Chicago: Health Administration Press.
- LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES ET AL. v. RAIMONDO, SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, ET AL., 22-451 (The United States Supreme Court January 17, 2024).
- Natural Resources Defense Council. (2024, June 28). Supreme Court Gives Unaccountable Judges Power Over Agency Actions, Overturning 40 Years of Precedent. Retrieved from NRDC: https://www.nrdc.org/press-releases/supreme-court-gives-unaccountable-judges-power-over-agency-actions-overturning-40